A presentation at S4x20 in January 2020 in Miami Beach, FL, USA by Kelly Shortridge
C ONTROLLED C HAOS The Inevitable Marriage of DevOps & Security Kelly Shortridge (@swagitda_) S4x20
Hi, I’m Kelly 2 @swagitda_
“Chaos isn’t a pit. Chaos is a ladder.” ― Petyr Baelish, Game of Thrones 3 @swagitda_
Software is eating the world. It’s on the amuse-bouche course in ICS. 4 @swagitda_
Infosec has a choice: marry DevOps or be rendered impotent & irrelevant 5 @swagitda_
Denying the future & the benefits of modern systems will only hurt ICS 6 @swagitda_
How should infosec control chaos & make a marriage to DevOps last? 7 @swagitda_
DevOps Dominion
DevOps is not automation or “agile” 10 @swagitda_
DevOps is a mindset that unifies responsibility and accountability. 11 @swagitda_
Infosec can join DevOps or take a back seat to the future of systems 12 @swagitda_
Chaos & resilience is infosec’s future 13 @swagitda_
What are DevOps’s priorities?
Optimization of software delivery performance so tech delivers value 15 @swagitda_
Stability & speed don’t conflict – resilience & innovation are bffs 16 @swagitda_
Security drives stronger DevOps results. Now ICS security must evolve. 17 @swagitda_
The Metamorphosis
Partitioning of responsibility & accountability engenders conflict 19 @swagitda_
After this evolution, DevOps will be held accountable for security fixes 20 @swagitda_
What goals should infosec pursue in this evolution? 21 @swagitda_
And… why should infosec goals diverge from DevOps goals? 22 @swagitda_
Infosec has arguably failed, so “this is how we’ve always done it” is invalid 23 @swagitda_
The Security of Chaos
“Things will fail” naturally extends into “things will be pwned” 25 @swagitda_
Security failure is when security controls don’t operate as intended 26 @swagitda_
What are the principles of chaotic security engineering? 27 @swagitda_
What are the benefits of the chaos / resilience approach? 30 @swagitda_
Benefits: lowers remediation costs & stress levels during real incidents 31 @swagitda_
Benefits: minimizes service disruption & improves confidence 32 @swagitda_
Benefits: creates feedback loops to foster understanding of systemic risk 33 @swagitda_
What other ways can infosec become more strategic? 34 @swagitda_
Time to D.I.E.
We need a model promoting qualities that make systems more secure 36 @swagitda_
Enter the D.I.E. model: Distributed, Immutable, Ephemeral 37 @swagitda_
Distributed: multiple systems supporting the same overarching goal 38 @swagitda_
Distributed infrastructure reduces risk of DoS attacks by design 39 @swagitda_
Immutable: infrastructure that doesn’t change after it’s deployed 40 @swagitda_
Servers are now disposable “cattle” rather than cherished “pets” 41 @swagitda_
Immutable infra is more secure by design – ban shell access entirely 42 @swagitda_
Unlimited lives is better for security than game over upon death 43 @swagitda_
Ephemeral: infrastructure with a very short lifespan (dies after a task) 44 @swagitda_
Ephemerality creates uncertainty for attackers (persistence = nightmare) 45 @swagitda_
Installing a rootkit on a resource that dies in minutes is a waste of effort 46 @swagitda_
ICS attacks take months to plan; ephemerality constantly disrupts it 47 @swagitda_
Optimizing for D.I.E. reduces risk by design & supports resilience 48 @swagitda_
A Phoenix Rises
Harness failure as a tool to help you prepare for the inevitable 50 @swagitda_
Game days: practice risky scenarios 51 @swagitda_
Prioritize game days based on potential business impacts 52 @swagitda_
Decision trees: start at target asset, work back to easiest attacker paths 53 @swagitda_
Determine the attacker’s least-cost path (hint: it doesn’t involve 0day) 54 @swagitda_
Architecting chaos
Begin with “dumb” testing before moving to “fancy” testing 56 @swagitda_
Think digital twins, analytics services, or O365… not field-level SCADA 57 @swagitda_
Controlling Chaos: Distributed 58 @swagitda_
Distributed mostly overlaps with availability in modern infra contexts 59 @swagitda_
Chaos Monkey: inject random instances failures to test resilience 60 @swagitda_
Infosec teams can use these tools but make attackers the source of failure 61 @swagitda_
Multi-region services present a fun opportunity to mess with attackers 62 @swagitda_
Shuffle IP blocks regularly to change attackers’ lateral movement game 63 @swagitda_
Controlling Chaos: Immutable 64 @swagitda_
Volatile environments with continually moving parts raise the cost of attack 65 @swagitda_
Create rules like, “If there’s ever a write to disk, crash the node” 66 @swagitda_
Attackers must stay in-memory, which hopefully makes them cry 67 @swagitda_
Metasploit Meterpreter + webshell: Touch passwords.txt & kaboom 68 @swagitda_
Infosec teams can build Docker images with a “bamboozle layer” 69 @swagitda_
Mark garbage files as “unreadable” to craft enticing bait for attackers 70 @swagitda_
Potential goal: self-healing edge devices with immediate reversion 71 @swagitda_
Test: inject attempts at writing to disk to ensure detection & reversion 72 @swagitda_
Controlling Chaos: Ephemeral 73 @swagitda_
Most infosec bugs are stated-related – get rid of state, get rid of bugs 74 @swagitda_
Reverse uptime: longer host uptime adds greater security risk 75 @swagitda_
Test: retrograde libraries, containers, other resources in CI/CD pipelines 76 @swagitda_
Leverage lessons from toll fraud – cloud billing becomes security signal 77 @swagitda_
Test: exfil TBs or run a cryptominer to inform billing spike detection 78 @swagitda_
Conclusion
Security cannot gatekeep DevOps. It must marry it. 80 @swagitda_
Chaos/resilience are natural homes for infosec & represent its future. 81 @swagitda_
Infosec must now evolve to unify responsibility & accountability. 82 @swagitda_
ICS is already cloudy – get ready now before OT migrates as well. 83 @swagitda_
Giving up control isn’t a harbinger of doom. Resilience is a beacon of hope. 84 @swagitda_
“You must have chaos within you to give birth to a dancing star.” ― Friedrich Nietzsche 85 @swagitda_
@swagitda_ /in/kellyshortridge kelly@greywire.net 86 @swagitda_